IDPC Advocacy Guide for Civil Society

THE UNITED NATIONS REVIEW OF GLOBAL POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS

ADVOCACY GUIDE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

VERSION ONE – OCTOBER 2007

In the spring of 2009, the political representatives of all national governments will gather in Vienna to decide a way forward for the management of the international drug control system. The outcome of this meeting, and the process of review and preparation that precedes it, is at the moment uncertain, as many member states are questioning the value of a continuing reliance on law enforcement and supply reduction to resolve drug problems, and are pushing for a greater emphasis on policies and programmes that focus on the health and social consequences of drug markets and drug use.

Civil society organisations around the world are currently considering how best to get involved with this process, and influence its outcome. This advocacy guide has been produced by the International Drug Policy Consortium (www.idpc.info) to give NGOs information on how the process is unfolding, and ideas on how they can engage in effective advocacy. This version of the guide has been produced in September 2007. It gives a background to, and explanation of, the review process, and a brief introduction to the issues that we will be focussing on as the process develops. Updated versions will be produced at key stages of the process, and distributed to all interested NGOs. The second version of this guide will be distributed in December 2007, and will include a more detailed discussion of the emerging advocacy positions promoted by the IDPC, and details of the preparations for the 2008 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to be held in March 2008 in Vienna.

The IDPC will also be hosting a series of workshops over the next 18 months, that will provide our partners with the opportunity to debate the issues, network with government officials, and decide on next steps in the process. The next in this series of meetings will be held in late January 2008.

HOW IS THE DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM ORGANISED?

The present system of worldwide drug control is based upon three international conventions. These are the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. These enjoy widespread adherence with, as of July 2007, 183 states being Parties to the first and second of the three conventions, and 182 to the third.

A number of agencies are involved in the functioning and oversight of the conventions. These include the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND or Commission), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB or Board) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC or Office).

ECOSOC serves as the central forum for discussing international economic and social issues, and for formulating policy recommendations addressed to Member States and the United Nations system. The UN Charter entrusts ECOSOC with international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters. In order to perform these functions the Council established various functional commissions, including the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The CND is the central policy-making body for the UN drug control system. Its brief includes the conduct of ongoing analysis of the global drug situation and the development of proposals designed to combat drug-related problems and to reinforce the system of controls. As a formally constituted organization of the UN, the CND meets annually for a period not exceeding eight days. The Commission comprises 53 UN member States, elected by ECOSOC. Its functions are assigned to it by the drug control conventions. These provisions authorize the CND to consider all matters related to the objectives of the Conventions and to oversee their implementation. As a treaty organ under the 1961, 1971 and 1988 Conventions, on the basis of recommendations by the World Health Organization (WHO) or the INCB, the Commission decides the regulatory measures to be taken on narcotic and psychotropic drugs and precursor chemicals. The body therefore plays a pivotal role in all international drug policy making. The Commission relies on the UNODC for administrative and technical support.

The INCB is the “independent and quasi-judicial” control organ for the implementation of the drug control treaties. The Board was created under the Single Convention and was established in 1968. It is technically independent of Governments, as well as of the UN, with its 13 individual members serving in their personal capacities. The WHO nominates a list of candidates from which three members of the INCB are chosen, with the remaining 10 selected from a list proposed by Member governments. They are elected by ECOSOC and can call upon the expert advice of the WHO.

The Board has the authority to assess worldwide scientific and medical requirements for controlled substances based on estimates from member states and subsequently allocates quotas among Parties in an attempt to prevent leakage of drugs from licit sources into the illicit market. It also monitors compliance with the provisions of the drug control conventions. Areas of concern can be raised at different levels from individual state to the UN General Assembly. The INCB itself has no power to enforce the Conventions. However, when highlighting to the Parties, ECOSOC and the CND a perceived failure to carry out obligations under the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, the INCB can recommend to Parties that they stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory concerned. Such a sanction has never been applied and the Board has relied on the tactic of “naming and shaming” what it considers to be errant Parties in its Annual Report. Recent years have seen the INCB assume a wider role, reporting on trends in drug trafficking and illicit use, monitoring precursor chemicals in line with the provisions of the 1988 Convention, and commenting on policy developments among UN Member States.

The UNODC is the UN agency responsible for coordinating international drug control activities. It was established in 2002 and currently has around 500 staff members worldwide. Its headquarters are in Vienna and it has 21 field offices as well as a liaison office in New York. The UNODC was established by the UN Secretary-General to “enable the Organization to focus and enhance its capacity to address the interrelated issues of drug control, crime prevention and international terrorism in all its forms.” In fulfilling its mandate “to assist Member States in their struggle” against these issues the UNODC has a three pillar work programme. This consists of research and analytical work, normative work and field-based technical cooperation projects. To this end, the UNODC Drug Programme, formerly the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), runs alternative development projects, illicit crop monitoring and anti-money laundering programmes. As the lead agency for international drug control activities, the UNODC plays an important role in assisting Member States, particularly so-called “producer countries” and developing states, to effectively address a wide range of drug related problems. It also occupies a unique position for the compilation global data sets, to track and investigate international trends in drug production, manufacture, trafficking and use and to act as a central hub for the dissemination of best practice in the formulation and implementation of drug policy.

WHAT ARE THE STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEM?

Although to a certain extent inter-related, key weaknesses within the current UN drug control system can be identified within the following areas:

a) Institutional Structures

INCB - It is in relation to both the Boards “quasi-judicial” role and its role in scheduling substances where weaknesses exist in the way the INCB currently performs its duties. Within this context, four interconnected issue areas can be identified.

Treaty interpretation – The INCB currently holds very limited, rigid legal and non-universal - interpretations of the conventions. This frequently results in problematic statements and positions within INCB annual reports and in private letters to national Governments. In acting as a guardian rather than a watchdog of the conventions, the INCB generates tensions with some member states and other parts of the international drug control system.

(See http://www.internationaldrugpolicy.net/reports/BeckleyFoundation_Report_07.pdf)

Scheduling: Conflict between the INCB and WHO on scheduling decisions – recent years have seen - the INCB overstepping its mandate to provide unsolicited scheduling advice to member states. This is particularly problematic because in all such cases the Board’s recommendations contradict those coming from the WHO; the body responsible for scheduling issues.

Mandates: The Board’s Mission Creep – While the INCB’s mandate is clearly laid out within the - conventions, it is currently exceeding its authority and has over recent years illegitimately extended its role within the international drug control system. Among other places, evidence of this can be found in the current attitude of the Board towards member states, with whom it apparently sees itself as at least an equal, and other parts of the UN system (for example, WHO) of which it apparently regards itself as superior.

Culture of secrecy - An issue that complicates all the above mentioned matters is the cloud of secrecy - under which the Board operates. For instance, all the Board’s missions, communications and letters (thousands each year) are confidential. Furthermore, there are no observers allowed at the INCB sessions and no minutes are available, even to member states. The result of such a culture of secrecy is that the INCB lacks any accountability procedure and has arguably become the least transparent and most secretive body within the UN.

UNODC – The UNODC itself states that “A comparative advantage for the Office is its very DNA as a multilateral entity, namely as an honest broker representing the interest of no single Member State.” However, in reality the issues of funding and diplomatic considerations have an enormous impact upon the implementation of this “guiding principle,” the type of projects that become operational, and ultimately the overall functioning of the UNODC. The Office’s consolidated Budget, consisting of the budgets of the drug and the crime programmes, generally relies upon voluntary contributions from donors for around 90% of its funding. The remaining 10% comes from the regular UN budget: that is to say, funds given to the UN as a whole to pay for staff, basic infrastructure and some activities. Recent years have seen a growing trend by donors to earmark their voluntary contributions to specific projects and activities. For instance, in the period 2006-2007 between 70-80% of voluntary contributions were earmarked. As such at any point in time, the UNODC is operating with an incomplete ‘jigsaw’ of funding, with a high proportion of planned activities waiting for funds to be raised, and a wide range of donors demanding that the office pursue their own, often conflicting, policy and programme priorities. Such a fiscal reality leads to an unhelpful politicization of Office activities and weakens its role within the system. The UNODC performs at its strongest when it is providing objective analysis and expertise to member states, and facilitating policy debate between conflicting positions. However, all too often, the Office has operated as a political actor in its own right, defending the effectiveness of existing policies and programmes.

(b) System Cohesion

While there is a considerable degree of substantive agreement on drug policy between UN agencies, significant inconsistencies do remain. These exist within both the immediate confines of drug control framework, and between this framework and the wider activities and goals of the UN. The degree of inconsistency is fluid as both the politics and science surrounding drug policy issues alter over time. Nonetheless, it is possible for example to identify ongoing differences in approach between, on the one hand, the law enforcement orientation of the UNODC and the INCB’s rigidly zero-tolerance interpretation of the conventions and, on the other hand, the health and development orientation and wider interpretation of the conventions of other bodies such as UNAIDS, the United Nations Development Programme, WHO, World Bank and the United Nations Population Fund. Furthermore, law enforcement dominated strategies demonstrate a lack of cohesion between some sections of the international drug control system and broader UN principles on Human Rights, as laid out in instruments like the UN Charter and more recently the UN Millennium Goals.

(c) CND Mechanism

One of the negative effects of the lack of system cohesion is that member state delegates to the main UN forum for discussion and decision-making on drug policy are overwhelmingly drawn from the foreign affairs and law enforcement disciplines. This reinforces the primacy of law enforcement perspectives on an issue that has much wider social, health and human rights implications.

There are also procedural difficulties - for many years, all disputes within the CND have been settled by consensus. As one analyst notes, “This means that every decision usually comes down to the lowest common denominator – the one that is the least offensive to the largest number.” Such an operating process also means that it is easy for one member of the Commission to block a resolution. As a result “face-saving” solutions are often sought which leads to the vague wording of resolutions. Furthermore, the structure and final wording of resolutions is also often subject to “horse-trading” between CND members, with factors external to the issue drug control sometimes influencing policy positions within the Commission.

As a result, the annual gathering of member states to discuss drug policy invests an inordinate amount of time and energy in receiving long and self-congratulatory statements from member states, and rarely engages meaningfully in discussion of the true dilemmas inherent in the system, as member states avoid the diplomatic risks of raising difficult issues.

Finally, the entire process takes place with very little involvement of Civil Society, and in particular of those (such as drug users or growers representatives) who are most affected by the issue. In other areas of UN activity, NGOs are much more integrated into the policy making process (for example UNAIDS, where NGOs actually sit on the Programme Co-ordinating Board). However, in the drug control system, NGOs have too often been seen as a threat to the quality of discussion, rather than the expert resource that they are. Representatives of user groups or growers, for example, can bring detailed insight to the governmental discussions.

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS REVIEW?

In June 1998, the UN General Assembly met in a Special Session (UNGASS) to address the global response to illegal drugs. This 1998 UNGASS culminated in the adoption of a declaration committing member states to the achievement of significant and measurable results in reduction of illicit supply and demand for drugs by the year 2008. A review of progress against these objectives has been initiated, and will be delivered to the 2008 CND. Doubts have already been expressed regarding the objectivity and credibility of this review – it is relying almost entirely on data officially submitted by governments to the UNODC, and will not be addressing some of the key policy dilemmas that are related to drug use and drug markets, such as the prevention of HIV infection. Despite these limitations, the review is sure to show that the hoped for significant reductions in supply and demand have not been achieved – it is how member states react to this reality that will dictate the next 10 years of international drug policy.

At the 2007 meeting of the CND, delegates agreed that following the 2008 CND meeting, a period of global reflection will begin that will lead into the political meeting at the 2009 CND to draw conclusions and plan for the future. This 2008/09 process is a significant opportunity for civil society to engage with issues surrounding the current international drugs control regime, and advocate for essential reforms, particularly in the areas of HIV/AIDS and human rights.

There is increasing evidence that current approaches pursued within the international drug control regime undermine efforts to promote both an effective response to HIV by undermining official support for harm reduction interventions at both the domestic and international levels. At the same time, the current international approach to drugs has the effect of encouraging and justifying the treatment of at least 200 million drug users as criminals, which in many countries can lead to human rights abuses carried out against people who use drugs under the guise of law enforcement, supply reduction or treatment programmes (including mass incarceration, extra-judicial killings, coercive drug treatment, and the use of the death penalty for drug offences).

The determination of the UN system to stem the production of cocaine and heroin has also led to the pursuit of policies in source countries that, while not achieving their aim of reducing production, have contributed to the environmental, social and economic problems experienced in drug producing areas. Meanwhile, the power and reach of the criminal organisations that profit from the illegal drugs trade continues to grow.

The 2008/09 review process therefore presents a significant opportunity to address these policy challenges – it is no longer sufficient for the UNODC and member states to simply reaffirm existing programmes. Civil society has a significant contribution to make in this regard, by promoting constructive ideas for improving the international drug control system, and ensuring that government representatives to the 2009 meeting seriously reflect experience and public opinion from their own countries.

WHAT ARE THE KEY ISSUES FOR THE REVIEW?

While Civil Society organisations around the world will have a wide range of perspectives and priorities for the review, the IDPC has proposed a focus on four key issues where it is felt that current policies and programmes could realistically be improved through this process:

STRUCTURAL REFORM – At a national and local level, the structures for creating, implementing and reviewing drug policy have become increasingly cross-departmental, as administrations realise the interconnections between the law enforcement, health and social aspects of the problem. Most countries have now enacted national strategies that are overseen by co-ordinating bodies with representation from all relevant branches of government. No such mechanism exists within the United Nations programme. In the absence of a system-wide strategic mechanism, the UNODC and CND focuses on its own crime and control agenda to promote a law enforcement perspective. This perspective is reinforced by the INCB’s rigid interpretation of the conventions. Meanwhile, the much larger UN agencies that deal with the consequences of the drug market (For example, WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP and the Human Rights bodies) play only a marginal role in drug policy formulation and programme implementation. This needs to change to a system where a co-ordinated strategy, that reflects a balance between the concerns and standards of all the relevant UN agencies, is developed in a truly collaborative fashion.

A related challenge is to refocus the role of both the UNODC and INCB. These agencies should be objective and independent centres of expertise that support member states in analysing the complexity of the drug problems in their territories, and the development of effective responses. All too often in practice, the leadership of both bodies have assumed a political role, championing a particular policy perspective, even in the face of clearly divergent views amongst member states, or amongst different UN agencies. The opportunity of this 10-year review should be used to adjust the role of these two bodies. In the case of the UNODC, this would mean expanding its research and analysis role, and its dissemination of advice and guidance to member states based on the evidence base it has collated. In the case of the INCB, this would mean returning to its original mandate of identifying functional weaknesses in member states’ adherence to the drug control system, rather than getting involved in matters that should remain the preserve of national policymaking.

IDPC Position Paper 5 (http://www.idpc.info/php-bin/documents.pl?ID=1000069) goes into these issues in more detail, and we aim to bring forward constructive recommendations in the coming months for how a functional structure for drug control can be created through the current UN reform agenda, that member states can see as an improvement on current arrangements.

HARM REDUCTION - This phrase has been mainly associated over the last 20 years with the delivery of public health measures to drug users that help them avoid HIV and other infections, but also overdoses and other negative health consequences that arise from their use of drugs. It has also become somewhat of a ‘political football’ in drug policy circles, as this range of activities represents the clearest and most widespread departure from a policy of zero tolerance that focuses effort entirely on activities that seek to minimise or eradicate drug use and drug markets. The concept of harm reduction, therefore, has a much wider implication for drug policy and programmes, particularly as the UNODC itself now no longer talks about a goal of eradicating drug use, but of the goal of containment of the market at current levels. The IDPC, while sceptical of the claims that containment is being achieved, consider that this change of discourse allows for a shift of focus of international efforts towards responding to the consequences of drug use. This would mean greater efforts to respond to the health risks of drug use, but also to the social consequences such as addiction, the impact on family and community life, and drug related crime. Even within the law enforcement arena, such a realignment of focus would mean moving away from the obsession with eradication of crops, seizing drugs and arresting users, to measuring success for example in terms of minimising the power and profits of organised crime, or of the extent of drug related corruption.

Such a shift of focus would not require any change to Conventions or national legislation, but would have an enormous impact on the design of UN programmes – very little attention has been paid over the years at UN level to the social and community consequences of drug use, and the UN drug control agencies have at times acted as a brake, for example, on the scaling up of HIV prevention measures amongst drug users. A more productive future strategy would involve a clear commitment of the UN agencies to tackling the consequences of drug use and drug markets, and the expansion of programmes that support demand reduction, crime reduction, and HIV prevention efforts. IDPC Position Paper 2 (http://www.idpc.info/php-bin/documents.pl?ID=1000059) goes into this issue in more detail, and we intend to work with member states in the coming months to promote the adoption of these concepts through the review process.

SOURCE COUNTRY ISSUES – In recent years, global production of opium has become more concentrated in Afghanistan. Similarly, the majority of global cultivation of coca is concentrated in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The predominant response of the authorities has been to attempt to forcibly eradicate these crops, or deter farmers from cultivating them through harsh law enforcement strategies. These efforts have led to limited success, and have serious consequences for legitimate economic and social development, and the human rights of affected communities. Most farmers grow crops used in illicit drug production as a means of basic subsistence. Eradicating their often only source of income prior to the establishment of alternative livelihoods results in a downward spiral of poverty for those affected, and ensures that they will replant, leading to the geographical expansion of such crops. The continued promotion of forced eradication programmes in the Andes and Afghanistan cannot be justified either in terms of the prospects for success in reducing overall drug supply, or of their impact on the local situation. Forced eradication programmes are often counter-productive, generating social conflict and political violence and undermining government legitimacy. Aerial eradication programmes under ‘Plan Colombia’ have been implemented at the cost of billions of dollars since 2002 – but in the 5 years since, the amount of cocaine production in Colombia has risen by 20%. Western troops have been present in Afghanistan since 2001 – but the levels of opium production in the last two years have been higher than ever. It could be argued that these campaigns need more time, and that eventually they will produce results, but the evidence from countries where cultivation has declined suggests that the development of realistic alternative livelihoods and legitimate social structures is much more effective in undermining the power of organised crime in these areas.

The aid and development agendas promoted by, for example, the UNDP and the World Bank represent a much more realistic solution to the poverty and lawlessness of current areas of drug cultivation, than the continuation of eradication programmes that are mainly directed at poor peasant farmers. Many member states support this development-led approach, but others continue to promote forced eradication programmes – the UN review should re-assess the prospects for success in pursuing enforced eradication, and set out a future strategy that prioritises the rights and needs of the citizens in areas of cultivation.

IDPC Position Paper 3 (http://www.idpc.info/php-bin/documents.pl?ID=1000064) goes into these issues into further detail, and we intend to bring forward proposals for the priorities and principles that should be incorporated into future strategies for international action in areas where crops used in the production of illegal drugs are cultivated.

HUMAN RIGHTS – It is becoming increasingly clear that there are many aspects of the implementation of the global drug control system that potentially contradict the human rights and judicial standards that are promoted in other parts of the UN system. For example:

More than 30 member states still retain the death penalty for drug law offences, and several have - continued the practice of public execution of drug users and dealers to ‘celebrate’ international anti-drugs day on June 26^th.

Police and military action that is purportedly aimed at tackling drug markets can involve extrajudicial - killings, torture and detention without charge or trial.

Campaigns of eradication against specific crops, or against the use of specific substances, can result in - attacks on the human rights of certain groups.

Law enforcement efforts to identify, arrest and punish drug users can lead to the breach of rights - to privacy, of normal standards of criminal justice process, and of proportionality in sentencing.

As the process of UN reform is increasingly calling for cohesion between the policies and programmes of the various UN agencies, we should at the very least expect that the drug control agencies clearly condemn any activities undertaken in the pursuit of drug control, that contravene international human rights and judicial standards. The IDPC is planning to produce a paper in early 2008 that examines these tensions, and that makes recommendations for greater consistency of UN action between the two areas

HOW CAN NGOS GET INVOLVED?

The opportunities for NGO involvement in UN drug policy processes have in the past been very limited, but there are promising signs for greater engagement this time around. NGOs that are interested in contributing to these debates, and influencing the outcome, have the following options for engagement:

THE ‘BEYOND 2008’ INITIATIVE – The Vienna NGO Committee has been allocated funding to organise a series of consultation seminars for NGOs in each region of the world. These seminars will take place between September 2007 and March 2008, and will provide a platform for NGOs to debate the impact that the global drug control system has had in their country or region over the last 10 years. The dates and venues for the seminars in your area can be found on the VNGOC website (www.vngoc.org). The emerging themes from these consultations will be reviewed at a global NGO conference to be held in Vienna in July 2008, the conclusions from which will be circulated to member states, and formally presented at the 2009 political meeting. The VNGOC website also contains a downloadable questionnaire that NGOs can complete and return – the information from these questionnaires will be collated and presented to policymakers.

THE IDPC PROGRAMME – IDPC members are developing an advocacy plan for the UN review. This plan will be based on the 5 principles for drug policy that have already been agreed by IDPC members(http://www.idpc.info/php-bin/documents.pl?ID=1000043), but there are no constraints on NGOs who are not current members of the IDPC becoming involved in this work. If your organisation supports these principles, and wishes to work through the IDPC to promote them through the review process, you can help our work in any of the following ways:

Helping to develop advocacy ideas and materials. We held an initial meeting in Lisbon in September - 2007 to discuss the key issues to be pursued over the next 18 months, and identify the appropriate materials and advocacy approaches. Interested parties will thereafter be involved in refining positions and processes through a series of meetings and regular email exchanges.

Expanding channels of communication with policymakers. As decisions on the future shape of drug - control will be made by national governments, it is crucial that we maximise the number and quality of our contacts with responsible officials and politicians, who will represent their country at the review. NGOs involved in this process should therefore seek to identify the relevant individuals in their governments, establish contact to publicise the IDPC positions, and assess the level of support or resistance.

Engaging the interest of NGOs and government agencies in related fields, such as health, development - and human rights. As mentioned above, the impact of drug control policies on these policy areas has so far received too little attention, and there is a lack of co-ordination at UN level between the responsible agencies. NGOs involved in this process can help to identify key actors, and seek to get them involved.

Mobilising political and public opinion. Most previous UN gatherings to discuss drug policy have had - very little media or parliamentary scrutiny - despite the importance of the issue, few commentators relate the UN process to domestic drug policy issues. NGOs involved in this process should therefore seek to create interest in this process amongst the media and politicians in their own country, by identifying interested journalists in key media outlets, placing articles and editorials reflecting our advocacy positions, disseminating information to politicians, and stimulating political debate during the preparation of the government position on the review.

INDEPENDENT ADVOCACY

Of course, any individual NGO (or group of NGOs) may have their own ideas on the issues to be covered, or the advocacy approaches to take, that will not be possible to pursue through the two structures described above. You may therefore prefer to develop your own advocacy plans and tactics. A multiplicity of positions and approaches will be a sign of a healthy debate, and the IDPC would be keen to continue to share information with any groups working in a constructive manner to influence the review.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

The IDPC will continue to develop constructive proposals for member states to pursue through the review process, and to provide information and support to its members and other NGOs as they pursue their advocacy activities. Updated versions of this advocacy guide will be produced and disseminated as the review process unfolds, and regular meetings will be organised for NGOs to discuss the emerging agenda, and agree advocacy plans. The first of these was held in Lisbon in September 2007, and the next is planned for the end of January 2008.

International Drug Policy Consortium October 2007

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IDPC Briefing Paper Number 6 - The World Drug Report 2007.

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INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM

THE WORLD DRUG REPORT 2007

STILL WINNING THE WAR ON DRUGS?

SUMMARY

On the publication of the World Drug Report in 2006, the IDPC

cast doubt on the claim that the global drug problem was being

brought under control. Th e United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC) makes the claim in even stronger terms in

its latest report on the state of the global drug market, the 2007

World Drug Report. Th is report was published on June 26th, the

International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. In

keeping with previous World Drug Reports, it contains much

useful data and analysis, but its credibility is undermined by the

selective use of the available evidence to support questionable

claims for the success of the UN track record in tackling illegal

drug markets. Such confident assertions of support for traditional

law enforcement models of drug policy are particularly surprising

as many Member States are moving away from this position, and

the UN itself is due to embark on what is meant to be an objective

review of progress and achievement in global drug control with

the 10-year evaluation of the 1998 UN General Assembly Special

Session (UNGASS) on drugs. Th e increasingly simplistic, and

seemingly conclusive, view emanating from the responsible UN

agency must call into question its ability to act as an honest facilitator

of what will be a crucial review of policies that affect hundreds of

millions of people around the world. While it is already obvious

that the international community will not reach the targets it

set at the 1998 UNGASS – to significantly reduce supply and

demand of drugs over a ten year period – the UNODC is under

tremendous pressure to show significant progress. However, it will

be difficult to argue that the world is on the right track on the basis

of consumption and production figures since the 1998 UNGASS,

or even since the entry into force of the 1961 Single Convention.

Th e preface to the report makes an attempt to show significant

results, despite the fact that its own data show the opposite. Th is

reflects UNODC ’s ambiguous position as both a political agent

and a supposedly objective centre of expertise.

In this briefing paper, we attempt to focus on what can be

understood from the available data, what dilemmas it raises for

policymakers, and the key issues to be resolved in the forthcoming

review.

WHAT IS THE DATA TELLING US?

The first thing to understand is that the data available globally

on illegal drug production, distribution and use, is notoriously

difficult to gather with any accuracy or consistency. The

UNODC reports themselves acknowledge this reality, and

we presented a summary of methodological problems in

our review of the 2006 World Drug Report [IDPC briefing

paper 2: “The 2006 World Drug Report. Winning the War

on Drugs?”]. Secondly, the good quality data that is available

comes almost exclusively from the rich westernised nations

that have the capacity and resources to conduct complex

studies and surveys. Estimates of the extent of production,

trafficking and prevalence of use in large parts of the world

are therefore extremely unreliable. Thirdly, the amount of

truly new information that has become available in the last 12

months is limited. For example most of the data on prevalence

comes from national surveys conducted in 2004 and 2005.

Within the body of the 2007 World Drug Report, there are

repeated warnings that the data should be treated with caution

(for example, see pp 60 or 270). It is therefore remarkable

that the preface to the report contains such confident claims

for the success of the UN programme, with no reference to

the limitations of the evidence, and therefore the caution that

should be exercised in drawing policy conclusions. There are

3 particular areas where a close analysis of the data would

seem to undermine these conclusions:

THE WORLD DRUG REPORT 2007

STILL WINNING THE WAR ON DRUGS?

Th e International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) is a global network of NGO 's and professional networks that specialise in issues related to illegal drug use. Th e Consortium aims to promote objective and open debate on the effectiveness, direction and content of drug policies at national and international level, and supports evidence-based policies that are effective in reducing drug-related harm. It produces its own briefing and position papers, disseminates the reports of its member organizations about particular drug related matters, and offers expert consultancy services to policymakers and officials around the world.

• There is no doubt that cultivation of opium has become

concentrated in fewer countries in recent years, and

that coca production has not expanded beyond the

Andean region. However, the claim that this represents

a downward trend in the global production of either

heroin or cocaine is not supported by the evidence. As

the WDR charts themselves show, annual illicit global

production of opium is broadly stable over the last 15

years, with the only signifi cant trend being a worrying

increase in production over the last two years, driven

by massive increases in cultivation in Afghanistan. Th e

WDR also states that most of the heroin supplied to

the US market is produced in Latin America, but the

offi cial fi gures show a level of opium production in Latin

America that would only be suffi cient to supply a fraction

of US demand. So is the US market being supplied from

elsewhere, or are the Latin American production fi gures

severely underestimated? In terms of coca production, the

UNODC claim is that ‘supply stability has been achieved

only through intensive eradication eff orts, especially in

Colombia’. Th is is a remarkably disingenuous statement

considering that the same paragraph reports an 8%

increase in global production in the last year, and the

promoted tactic of ‘intensive eradication’ in Colombia

has been conspicuously ineff ective in reducing cocaine

production, with a more than 20% increase in cocaine

production in Colombia since the eradication programme

was commenced in 2000, according to offi cial UN fi gures.

Adding to the confusion regarding the real position are

the signifi cant variations on the fi gures and trends on

opium and coca cultivation between the two main data

sources – the United Nations and the US government.

Th ey both attempt to track trends on the same basis

– the number of hectares cultivated – but come up with

entirely diff erent fi gures and trends. For example, the

UN estimate for Colombian coca cultivation in 2006 is

78,000 ha., while the US estimate is 157,200 ha, twice as

much and more than the total of the area the UNODC

claims for the whole Andean region.1 As both cannot be

correct, it follows that any estimation has to be treated

with caution.

• Th e WDR claims ‘another source of good news is that law

enforcement has improved’ – ie that a greater proportion

of cocaine and heroin is being intercepted before it

reaches consumers. It is welcome that the UNODC

and national governments are attempting to assess

interdiction eff orts in terms of their impact on consumer

markets, rather than simply measuring success in terms

of numbers of seizures, but once again these fi gures must

be treated with caution. In the preface to the WDR, for

example, Antonio Costa (Executive Director of the

UNODC), claims that ‘almost half ’ of global cocaine

production is being intercepted by law enforcement

agencies [WDR 07 p2]. Within the text of the Report,

however, while fi gures are produced to the eff ect that

cocaine seizures have risen from 34% in 2004 to 42%

of estimated total production in 2005, considerable

qualifi cation is placed upon these fi gures, and rightly so:

their provisional nature must be acknowledged. Th ese

percentages are calculated by subtracting total cocaine

seizures, as reported by members states, from the

estimated fi gure of global cocaine production, which is

given as 980 metric tonnes. Without entering into the

complex methodological issues the construction of such

fi gures entails, they include a great many assumptions

about unknown quantities. Th ey also fail to take into

account the increased technical know-how underlying

expanded cocaine production—which has taken place

despite decreases in hectares cultivated. Th e Report

acknowledges these considerations, and explicitly

states that “Th e result” of such omissions “could be an

overestimated global cocaine interception rate.” [WDR

07 p.70]. If the production estimate is faulty, then any

calculation based upon it is misleading. Of most concern

is the lack of a link between the claimed improvements

in interception rates, and the indicators of availability

in consumer markets. Measures of price, purity or ease

of consumer access in the major markets for heroin and

cocaine indicate an increase in the availability of these

substances – the trend is of prices falling and purity

increasing, when one would expect the opposite if the

signifi cantly increased seizure rates were having any eff ect.

Th is paradox is recognised in the latest National Drug

Th reat Assessment published by the US government:

“Despite the fact that the highest recorded level of cocaine

interdiction and seizure was recorded in 2005—the fi fth

consecutive record-setting increase—there have been no

sustained cocaine shortages or indications of stretched

supplies in domestic drug markets. Th ese seemingly

inconsistent trends suggest greater source country

supply than was previously estimated…” [National

Drug Intelligence Centre, US Dept. of Justice. National

Drug Th reat Assessment 2007. p.3]. Similarly, according

to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug

Addiction (EMCDDA), the predominant 5-year trend

in Europe has been a decline in street price for cannabis,

heroin, amphetamine, ecstasy and cocaine: ‘Information

available from some of the high-prevalence countries

suggests that cocaine and ecstasy were considerably

more expensive in the late 1980s and early 1990s than

they are today. Drug use in Europe is cheaper than ever

before.’ the EMCDDA concludes.2

• Finally, the WDR claims that global demand for drugs

such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis and amphetamines

has stabilised. Th is may be true, and indeed most of

the large-scale surveys conducted recently in developed

countries have shown an overall picture of a levelling

off of prevalence after decades of consistent increases.

However, there are two reasons why the authorities

should not be complacent about these fi gures. Firstly,

overall prevalence rates mask specifi c trends in the use

of diff erent drugs – for example, the increase in cocaine

use in parts of Europe, or in illicit prescription drug use

in the USA. Secondly, the evidence of stabilisation seems

most visible in well-established consumer markets in

Europe, North America and Australasia, while increases

are continuing in emerging economies and developing

countries, where the mechanisms for measuring these

trends are weakest. It may be that signifi cant increases

in prevalence are being experienced in Africa, Asia or

Latin America, but are not yet showing up in UNODC

prevalence reporting mechanisms. Indeed, some proxy

indicators of a growing problem, such as increasing

cocaine seizures in Africa or treatment demand in

China, would suggest that this is the case. If the true

prevalence of illegal drug use in these continents

was known, it would most likely dwarf the current

estimated fi gure of 200 million users worldwide. Th e

report also seems to misrepresent some of the data that

is available – a decline in demand for cocaine in the

USA is prominently and confi dently stated, whereas

that country’s own National Drug Th reat Assessment

for 2007 states:

“Cocaine demand is stable: Indicators

of domestic cocaine demand show that the demand for

cocaine in the United States is relatively stable. According

to National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)

data, past year cocaine use (in any form) by individuals 12

and older has not increased or decreased signifi cantly since

2002. NSDUH and Monitoring the Future (MTF) data

indicate that past year cocaine use among adolescents has

also remained stable during this same period.”

SELECTIVE CONCLUSIONS

In the face of a complex mass of data of varying reliability,

signifi cant data gaps, and a wide range of views amongst member

states, one would expect the responsible UN agency to be

very cautious in its policy conclusions, and to concentrate on

providing a platform for reasoned consideration of the challenges

for future policy. Instead, the UNODC continues to play the

role of a champion of its existing set of policies and programmes

declaring, in advance of the planned review of progress since the

1998 UNGASS, the successful ‘containment’ of the world drug

problem, and stating (with no attempt to analyse the evidence

on causality) that this success is due to strong law enforcement

practice, and clear anti-drug messages. We have shown above how

the claims of containment have been based on a questionable

analysis of available data. Indeed, at one point in his preface to

the WDR, Mr Costa, seems to be claiming even greater success

by referring to ‘a clear correlation between UN-led drug control

eff orts and the current recession in the drug economy’ – by any

standard, a recession refers to a signifi cant reduction in activity,

but nowhere in the report is there any indication of such a global

reduction of supply or demand, and the regular statements

attributing encouraging trends to UN-supported programmes are

not backed up by any analysis of causality. We have already talked

about the lack of a link between forced eradication programmes

in Colombia and reduced production and use of cocaine, but give

two more examples here of the tendency of the UNODC to draw

selective conclusions:

• In the preface to the report, Mr Costa states (in the

context of a claimed stabilisation of global cannabis

use) that ‘the health warnings on higher potency

cannabis, delivered in past World Drug Reports, appear

to be getting through.’ Notwithstanding the doubts

about whether the perceived stabilisation is real, the

assumption that any global trend in the behaviour of

hundreds of millions of cannabis users can be attributed

to the statements in the World Drug Report is clearly

absurd. As mentioned above, the surveys indicating

some stability have been conducted primarily in rich

western countries with well established high rates of

cannabis use amongst young people. It may be that these

groups are heeding the health warnings on cannabis

that have been disseminated in these countries, or

other factors – such as better education and prevention,

changes in law enforcement, wider socio-economic

changes, or changes in fashion and culture – may be

more infl uential. It is also possible that the cannabis

market in these countries has reached a natural

levelling point – with a limit on the proportion of

young people interested in being casual or regular users.

Local or national analyses of the correlation between

these factors and rates of cannabis use have tended

to emphasise the importance of socio-economic and

cultural factors, rather than the impact of government

programmes [Parker, H., Aldridge, J. and Measham F.

“Illegal leisure: Th e normalization of adolescent recreational

drug use.” London: Routledge. Blackman, S. “Chilling

out: Th e cultural politics of substance consumption, youth

and drug policy.” Maidenhead: Open University Press].

Indeed, strong law enforcement against cannabis users

(often promoted within the UN System for its deterrent

impact) has not been shown to correlate with reduced

prevalence [Reinerman, C., Cohen, P.D.A. and Kaal,

H.L. (2004) “Th e limited relevance of drug policy:

Cannabis in Amsterdam and San Francisco” American

Journal of Public Health, 94, 836-842. MacCoun, R.

and Reuter, P. (2001) “Evaluating alternative cannabis

regimes.” British Journal of Psychiatry, 178, 123-128,

Lenton S (2005) “Deterrence theory and the limitations

of criminal penalties for cannabis use”. In, T. Stockwell,

P. Gruenewald, J. Toumbourou & W. Loxley (Eds.),

Preventing harmful substance use: Th e evidence base for

policy and practice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons].

Th e complex challenge of responding to widespread

cannabis use, and minimising the harms associated

with it, can not be resolved simply through the issuing

of statements, however tough, from policymakers and

UN agencies.

• Also in the preface, the report claims that the

‘recession in the drug economy…’ (see above) is due

to the fact that ‘the world seems to be taking seriously

the commitment made at a UN General Assembly

Special Session in 1998 to take enhanced action to

reduce both the illicit supply of, and the demand for

drugs by 2008.’ However, the WDR fails to document

a recession. On the contrary, market indicators like

declining price and rising purity of cocaine and heroin

indicate abundant availability, which in terms of

drugs markets means that they are thriving. But even

if it were true, this statement makes the assumption

that any containment of the world drug problem is

the result of governments pursuing the UNODC’s

preferred drug policies and programmes. Furthermore,

the interpretation of many countries of the concept

of taking their commitments seriously, all too often

means the implementation of law enforcement

crackdowns on drug users. Most of the countries

that have reported stabilisation or reductions in

prevalence in recent years have actually reduced their

reliance on harsh law enforcement during this period,

suggesting that this is not a key factor in predicting

prevalence trends. While it is tempting to think

that government action is paramount, we have to

consider the possibility that any encouraging trends in

production, traffi cking or use are primarily the result

of external factors in the operation of the market, or

in wider society. For example, reductions in cannabis

cultivation in Morocco (heralded as a signifi cant

policy success in the WDR) may be the result of the

much wider cultivation of the drug by users and smallscale

dealers closer to consumer markets. Reductions

in opium cultivation in the golden triangle may have

been the result of decisions by the major traffi ckers to

switch production to more profi table synthetic drugs,

such as methamphetamine. Increases in cocaine use

in some European countries seem to be associated

with the increasing fashion for this drug in party

and club cultures, as the use of ecstasy declines. Th e

interaction between these diff erent factors – some

open to infl uence by governments, some not – are

poorly understood.

As we approach a strategic review of the learning and achievements

over the last 10 years, it would be preferable to see the UNODC

making a serious eff ort to analyse these complex issues and help

member states to understand the implications for their domestic

policy, rather than presenting simplistic conclusions on trends and

causality as if they are research and evidence based.Th e UNODC

claims to implement the policies the international community

has formulated, and not to make these policies itself. However, it

constantly attempts to shape these policies by taking the lead in

formulating and promoting particular approaches to international

drug control. Th e WDR is one of the instruments the UNODC

uses to impose its views. Th e UNODC’s ambiguous position as,

on the one hand, a political agent and, on the other, a centre of

expertise should be put to an end. Th e UN could move towards

the arrangement in the European Union, where the member

states make the policies and its centre of expertise, the EMCDDA,

provides the data on the basis of which they are debated and

reviewed. As part of the wider process of structural reform, the

UN should re-assess the role of the UNODC, providing it with

a less ambiguous role, and more clearly defi ning its relationship

with member states.

LIVING WITH A ‘CONTAINED’ MARKET

One of the most intriguing concepts, fi rst introduced during

the 2003 UNGASS mid-term review and expanded upon in

the 2006 and 2007 WDRs, is the idea that global action against

illegal drug production, traffi cking and use, has achieved a

‘containment’ of the situation. Since the 2003 UNGASS midterm

review - when it was already abundantly clear that the

original 1998 UNGASS target to signifi cantly reduce supply

and demand would not be meet - the Executive Director of the

UNODC has tried to change the discourse to ‘containment’ of

the global drug situation. Th is is a very diff erent objective than

the ‘signifi cant progress’ towards a drug free society that was

heralded in 1998, and may provide a more reasonable articulation

of what is possible through government action, and international

agreements. Notwithstanding the doubts we have regarding

the data currently presented, it may be that we are witnessing a

period of stabilisation in the scale of illegal drug markets in some

parts of the world. If such stabilisation is achieved at a level of

use that is signifi cantly lower than that of similar legally available

drugs, then this could provide a basis for the formation of more

balanced policies that support activities aimed at reducing the

harmful consequences arising from drug distribution and use. At

the moment, the UN system, and many national governments, are

hesitant (or downright hostile) towards some programmes aimed

at reducing harmful consequences, for fear that they undermine

work to reduce the overall scale of the market, or ‘send the wrong

message’ to drug users. Th is unease arises from the policy view

that considers eradication or disruption of the illegal market as

the only worthwhile goal of drug policy. In reality, and many

governments have long ago reached this conclusion, drug policy

should consist of the appropriate balance between actions that

seek to minimise the scale of the market, and those that seek to

minimise the consequential harms.

While there is no doubt that the UNODC has softened its

resistance to, and increased its programme support for, activities

that address the harmful consequences of drug use in recent

years, we consider that it is still some way short of what could

be considered an appropriate balance on these issues. In a

recent position paper, [IDPC Position Paper 2 - “Drug Policy

Objectives Should Increasingly Focus On Th e Consequences

Of Drug Use”], the IDPC laid out our proposals for a balanced

set of objectives for drug policy, encompassing both the scale

of the market, and its consequences. Many governments now

have a set of policy objectives that approximate to this ideal, but

the UN system still lags some way behind. Th e objectives set

in 1998 relate only to eff orts to reduce the scale of the market

and, since that time, the UNODC (and its linked quasi-judicial

agency, the International Narcotics Control Board) have

resisted any rebalancing of focus. Before we discuss how such a

rebalancing may be achieved in the forthcoming policy review,

we will highlight three areas where the obsession with market

scale undermines other objectives:

INADEQUATE LEADERSHIP ON HIV PREVENTION

In all of our reports on the work of the UNODC

and INCB, we have highlighted the inadequacy of their

commitment to addressing the most pressing global

challenge arising from drug use – the transmission of

HIV and Hepatitis infections through needle sharing

– and this paper is no different. An estimated 10%

of all new HIV infections worldwide occur through

injecting drug use, there are an estimated 13 million

current injectors worldwide, and several countries

and regions are reporting new outbreaks, or the

emerging conditions in which outbreaks could occur.

The UNODC remains the lead agency in the UN

system for responding to the threat of HIV infection

through injecting drug use and, shamefully, resisted

for many years the scaling-up of some of the most

effective preventative measures such as needle

exchange. Some of the more fundamental objections

to effective prevention have now been removed, and

the HIV prevention programme within UNODC has

been signifi cantly expanded in the last year, but the

current leadership provided by the agency remains

insuffi cient in the face of the scale of the challenge.

It is particularly frustrating that experts in this fi eld

have developed a reasonably accurate picture of

where new drug-related epidemics are happening

(and can be predicted in the near future), and have

developed packages of prevention activities that

have been proven to avert epidemics if implemented

with adequate speed and scale, but the international

community, and some of the national governments

affected, have been unwilling or unable to mobilise

the political will or resources to respond adequately.

In this context, it is astounding that another UNODC

World Drug Report is published with hardly a

mention of the nature of the challenge, where scaled

up prevention resources are required, or a call to

donor and affected governments to urgent action.

England and Wales, 2000.” Home Offi ce Research

Study 249. London, Home Offi ce] have shown that

the harm to individuals and society that arises from

drug use is heavily concentrated amongst a small

proportion of users – variously described as ‘problem’

or ‘hardcore’ users – whose patterns of use are more

extensive, chaotic, and risky. Th e WDR estimates

that this group constitutes only a small proportion of

all users of illegal drug users worldwide [ UNODC,

World Drug Report 2007 Vienna: United Nations

Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, p.5, p.9 & p.30]3.

However, many countries still pursue policies that

promote widespread arrest and harsh punishment

of all drug users, with long prison sentences not

uncommon even for those caught in possession of

small amounts, and the death penalty available in over

30 countries for drug law infractions. In addition to

the clear inconsistency with UN human rights norms,

these policies are expensive, and seem to have little

impact on overall rates of consumption. At the same

time, through adding to the social exclusion and

criminalisation of large numbers of citizens, they also

have signifi cant negative consequences in terms of

family and community cohesion, the engagement of

users in health and social programmes, and economic

activity. Looked at from the perspective of reducing

harmful consequences, therefore, repressive and badly

targeted enforcement policies can actually increase

drug problems. Despite this, the UNODC and

INCB have been slow to criticise the enactment of

inappropriate and unsophisticated drug laws, or the

pursuit of repressive enforcement tactics. A balanced

approach to drug policy would target law enforcement

and punishment on those users and dealers who were

causing the most harm to fellow citizens, or where real

impact on the market was possible. In the preface or

the body of the 2007 WDR, there is no discussion on

the appropriate targeting of law enforcement action

in order to minimise harmful consequences, and

the impression remains that the UNODC believes

that any drug law enforcement is inherently good

simply because it pursues the honourable objective of

reducing the market. A more sophisticated message is

necessary.

• Th e most direct dilemma between the focus on the

scale or consequences of the market exists in the

analysis of drug related crime. Th e nature and scale

of drug related crime, and how it aff ects individuals

and communities, has not been closely analysed or

monitored in the UNODC so far. Th e assumption has

been that the simple objective of reducing the scale

of the market is best achieved through direct action

against growers, traffi ckers and users. If the reduction

of the consequences of drug related crime was given

greater prominence in objective setting, the tensions

between eff orts to reduce the scale of the market, and

minimising the harmful consequences, would become

more apparent, and balanced policies and programmes

developed. Th e main harmful consequences arising

from the criminal activities associated with the drug

market are the power and wealth of the criminal

organisations that profi t from the market, the violence

and intimidation perpetrated by these organisations,

and the corruption of legitimate authority that

can result. Of course, successful law enforcement

operations directed against the organised crime

groups involved – intercepting the drugs, arresting

traffi ckers, and seizing their assets – serve to limit the

infl uence of particular groups. But a wider perspective

is also needed, driven by the objective of minimising

violence, intimidation and corruption. Th is objective

may be best achieved through traditional law

enforcement operations, but the common experience

has been of the ‘balloon eff ect’ – successful action

against one group only leads to the emergence of

others, often accompanied by an increase in violence

and corruption as new groups battle for control. A

more eff ective long term strategy may be for law

enforcement to explicitly manage the market in a

way that the power of, and harm to society caused

by, organised crime is minimised. Take the cannabis

market, for example, where the majority of global

demand is now supplied from small-scale cultivation

operations close to the point of consumption. Th is

has meant that the power and reach of large scale

cannabis traffi cking organisations is diminished and,

while problems associated with cannabis markets

remain, they are of a much lower order than those

associated with heroin or cocaine traffi cking.

In many countries, the form of drug related crime that causes

most harm to individuals and communities is the perpetration

of high levels of property crimes by problem drug users to

fund their habit. Th is negative consequence of drug use is not

aff ected by action against drug supply, but requires diff erent

strategies – for example many countries have produced

encouraging crime reduction results through programmes that

identify and refer criminally active drug users into treatment

programmes.

APPROACHING THE POLICY REVIEW

While much progress in data collection, programme

implementation, and international co-operation has been

achieved since the 1998 UNGASS on Drugs, it is clear that

the international community cannot claim that the global drug

market is under control – despite billions of dollars of investment,

the overall scale of the illegal market for all of the main drug

types would seem to have increased over the last 10 years, and the

profi ts from these markets continue to fl ow into the hands of a

wide range of organised crime groups. In his preface to the 2007

World Drug Report, Mr Costa calls for a ‘paradigm shift’ as we

approach the review of progress since the UNGASS in 1998, but

does not articulate what such a shift would consist of. Th e IDPC

would therefore like to suggest that we enter the next ten years of

global drug control on the basis of a paradigm shift towards the

following principles, if we are to avoid a continuation of the need

to present failure as success:

• Th at the concept of ‘zero tolerance’ or a ‘drug free world’

be replaced by more realistic policy objectives focussing

on the reduction of the harmful consequences of drug

production and use.

• Th at programmes and activities that focus on reducing

these harmful consequences should therefore be given

priority, in terms of resources and political support,

within the UN programme.

• Th at containment of the scale of the illegal drug market

is a more realistic objective for global law enforcement

and demand reduction eff orts.

• Th at the over-riding objective of law enforcement

programmes against drug production and traffi cking

should be the minimisation of criminal activity, and its

impact on citizens and communities, rather than the

eradication of drug markets.

• Th at there is an explicit recognition of the fact that the

millions of people involved in the cultivation of plants

used in drug manufacture, and the hundreds of millions

of users, should not all be automatically assumed to be

criminal or deviant.

• Th at the UNODC should be refocussed as a true centre

of expertise to assist the international community with

transparent and objective information that supports

member states in formulating balanced and evidence

based policies.

Such a paradigm shift would resolve the current impasse in

policy debate at the UN, (where any acknowledgment of the

complexities of the reality on the ground is seen as a betrayal of

the certainties behind the Conventions), and would provide a

basis for much more eff ective and targeted co-ordinated action in

the future. Our vision is that, in 10 years time, the international

community can genuinely claim success in containing the scale

of the illegal market, marginalising the power of organised crime,

and reducing the harmful health and social consequences of

drug production and use. Positive achievements of this type are

possible, but only if we set realistic and balanced objectives, and

re-focus our programmes accordingly.

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